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Abstract
The postmodern years of plenty, pastiche, and parataxis
are over. In fact, if we are to believe the many academics,
critics, and pundits whose books and essays describe the
decline and demise of the postmodern, they have been over
for quite a while now. But if these commentators agree the
postmodern condition has been abandoned, they appear
less in accord as to what to make of the state it has been
abandoned for. In this essay, we will outline the contours
of this discourse by looking at recent developments in
architecture, art, and film. We will call this discourse,
oscillating between a modern enthusiasm and a postmo-
dern irony, metamodernism. We argue that the metamo-
dern is most clearly, yet not exclusively, expressed by the
neoromantic turn of late associated with the architecture of
Herzog & de Meuron, the installations of Bas Jan Ader, the
collages of David Thorpe, the paintings of Kaye Donachie,
and the films of Michel Gondry.
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The choice in this election is not between
regions or religions or genders. It’s not about
rich vs. poor, young vs. old. And it is not
about black vs. white. This election is about
the past vs. the future. It’s about whether we
settle for the same divisions and distractions
and drama that passes for politics today or
whether we reach for a politics of common
sense and innovation, a politics of shared
sacrifice and shared prosperity. . . . Yes, we
can. Yes, we can change. Yes, we can.
(Barack Obama, ‘‘Yes, we can change’’,
speech addressed at Democratic Assembly,
28 January 2008)
I’m noticing a new approach to artmaking in
recent museum and gallery shows. . . . It’s an
attitude that says, I know that the art I’m
creating may seem silly, even stupid, or that it
might have been done before, but that doesn’t
mean this isn’t serious. At once knowingly self-
conscious about art, unafraid, and una-
shamed, these young artists not only see the
distinction between earnestness and detach-
ment as artificial; they grasp that they can be
ironic and sincere at the same time, and they
are making art from this compound-complex
state of mind. (Jerry Saltz, ‘‘Sincerity and
Irony Hug it Out’’, New Yorker Magazine, 27
May 2010)
The ecosystem is severely disrupted, the financial
system is increasingly uncontrollable, and the
geopolitical structure has recently begun to appear
as unstable as it has always been uneven.1 CEOs
and politicians express their ‘‘desire for change’’
at every interview and voice a heartfelt ‘‘yes we
can’’ at each photo-op. Planners and architects
increasingly replace their blueprints for environ-
ments with environmental ‘‘greenprints’’. And
new generations of artists increasingly abandon
the aesthetic precepts of deconstruction, para-
taxis, and pastiche in favor of aesth-ethical notions
of reconstruction, myth, and metaxis. These
trends and tendencies can no longer be explained
in terms of the postmodern. They express a (often
guarded) hopefulness and (at times feigned)
sincerity that hint at another structure of feeling,
intimating another discourse. History, it seems,
is moving rapidly beyond its all too hastily
proclaimed end.
In this essay, we will outline the contours of this
emerging structure of feeling. We will first discuss
the debate about the alleged demise of ‘‘the’’
postmodern and the apparent rise of another
modernism. We will argue that this modernism is
characterized by the oscillation between a typically
modern commitment and a markedly postmodern
detachment. We will call this structure of feeling
metamodernism.2 According to the GreekEnglish
Lexicon the prefix ‘‘meta’’ refers to such notions as
‘‘with’’, ‘‘between’’, and ‘‘beyond’’. We will use
these connotations of ‘‘meta’’ in a similar, yet not
indiscriminate fashion. For we contend that me-
tamodernism should be situated epistemologically
with (post) modernism, ontologically between
(post) modernism, and historically beyond (post)
modernism. And finally, we will take a closer look
at some tendencies that exemplify the current
dominant sensibility, in particular the Romantic
turn in contemporary aesthetics.
Some remarks, finally, on our approach. As the
essay’s title ‘‘Notes on metamodernism’’ suggests,
we intend what follows as a series of linked
observations rather than a single line of thought.
We seek to relate to one another a broad variety of
trends and tendencies across current affairs and
contemporary aesthetics that are otherwise in-
comprehensible (at least by the postmodern
vernacular), by understanding them in terms of
an emergent sensibility we come to call metamo-
dern. We do not seek to impose a predetermined
system of thought on a rather particular range of
cultural practices. Our description and interpreta-
tion of the metamodern sensibility is therefore
essayistic rather than scientific, rhizomatic rather
than linear, and open-ended instead of closed. It
should be read as an invitation for debate rather
than an extending of a dogma.
HISTORY BEYOND ‘‘THE END OF
HISTORY’’, ART BEYOND ‘‘THE END OF
ART’’ . . .
The postmodern years of plenty, pastiche, and
parataxis are over. In fact, if we are to believe the
many academics, critics, and pundits whose books
and essays describe the decline and demise of the
postmodern, they have been over for quite a while
now. Some argue the postmodern has been put to
an abrupt end by material events like climate
change, financial crises, terror attacks, and digital
revolutions. Others find that it has come to a more
gradual halt by merit of less tangible develop-
ments, such as the appropriation of critique by the
market and the integration of diffe´rance into mass
culture. And yet others point to diverging models
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of identity politics, ranging from global postcolo-
nialism to queer theory.3 As Linda Hutcheon puts
it, in the epilogue to the second edition of The
Politics of Postmodernity: ‘‘Let’s just say it: it’s
over’’.4
But if these commentators agree the postmo-
dern condition has been abandoned, they appear
less in accord as to what to make of the state it has
been abandoned for. Hutcheon therefore con-
cludes her epilogue with a pressing question*a
question to which she herself does not yet know
the answer:
The postmodern moment has passed, even if
its discursive strategies and its ideological
critique continue to live on*as do those of
modernism*in our contemporary twenty-
first-century world. Literary historical cate-
gories like modernism and postmodernism
are, after all, only heuristic labels that we
create in our attempts to chart cultural
changes and continuities. Post-postmodern-
ism needs a new label of its own, and I
conclude, therefore, with this challenge
to readers to find it*and name it for the
twenty-first century.5
Some theorists and critics have attempted to
answer Hutcheon’s question. Gilles Lipovetsky,
of course, has claimed the postmodern has given
way to the hypermodern. According to Lipovetsky,
today’s cultural practices and social relations have
become so intrinsically meaningless (i.e. pertaining
to past or future, there or elsewhere, or whatever
frame of reference) that they evoke hedonistic
ecstasy as much as existential anguish.6 The
philosopher Alan Kirby has proposed that the
current paradigm is that of digimodernism and/or
pseudomodernism. The cultural theorist Robert
Samuels has further suggested that our epoch is the
epoch of automodernism. And a number of critics
have simply adopted the syntactically correct but
semantically meaningless term post-postmodernism.
Most of these conceptions of the contemporary
discourse are structured around technological
advances. Kirby’s digimodernism, for instance,
‘‘owes its emergence and pre-eminence to the
computerization of text, which yields a new form
of textuality characterized in its purest instances by
onwardness, haphazardness, evanescence, and
anonymous, social and multiple-authorship’’.7
And Samuels’s automodernism presupposes a
correlation between ‘‘technological automation
and human autonomy’’.8 But many of these con-
ceptions*and Lipovetsky, Kirby, and Samuels’s,
however useful they are for understanding recent
developments, are exemplary here*appear to
radicalize the postmodern rather than restructure
it. They pick out and unpick what are effectively
excesses of late capitalism, liberal democracy, and
information and communication technologies
rather than deviations from the postmodern
condition: cultural and (inter) textual hybridity,
‘‘coincidentality’’, consumer (enabled) identities,
hedonism, and generally speaking a focus on
spatiality rather than temporality.9
Nicholas Bourriaud’s suggestion, altermodern-
ism, is probably the most well-known conception
of the latest discourse. However, it also appears to
be the least understood. In response to the exhibi-
tion of the same name Bourriaud curated at Tate
Britain in 2009, Andrew Searle reported in The
Guardian that ‘‘Postmodernism is dead . . . but
something altogether weirder has taken its
place’’.10 Similarly, the art critic for The Times,
Rachel Campbell-Johnston, testified that ‘‘Post-
modernism is so last year but [that] its re-
placement . . . is all over the shop’’.11 Bourriaud’s
accompanying essay invites a similar reaction: the
precise meaning of altermodernism is as slippery
and evasive as the structure of the argument is
unclear. As we understand it, Bourriaud ultimately
defines altermodernism as a ‘‘synthesis between
modernism and post-colonialism’’.12 According to
Bourriaud, this synthesis is expressed, respectively,
in heterochronicity and ‘‘archipelagraphy’’, in
‘‘globalized perception’’ as well as in nomadism,
and in an incorporation and/or affirmation
of otherness as much as in the exploration of
elsewheres.
Many of Bourriaud’s observations appear to be
spot-on. The developed world has extended*and
is still in the process of expanding*far beyond
the traditional borders of the so-called West.
Bourriaud argues that this development has led
to a heterochrony of globalized societies with
various degrees of modernity and a worldwide
archipelago without a center; to globally inter-
secting temporalities and historically interrelated
geographies. Consequently, he justly asserts, our
current modernity can no longer be characterized
by either the modern discourse of the universal
gaze of the white, western male or its postmodern
deconstruction along the heterogeneous lines of
Notes on metamodernism
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race, gender, class, and locality. He suggests that,
instead, it is exemplified by globalized perception,
cultural nomadism, and creolization. The alter-
modernist (artist) is a homo viator, liberated from
(an obsession with) his/her origins, free to travel
and explore, perceiving anew the global landscape
and the ‘‘terra incognita’’ of history.
Bourriaud’s conception of altermodernism is at
once evocative and evasive; it is as precise in its
observations as it is vague in its argumentation.
However provocative his writing may be therefore,
it is also problematic. For instance, his notion of a
‘‘globalized perspective’’ is somewhat difficult, for
it implies a multiplicity and scope of (simulacral)
vision neither phenomenologically nor physically
possible (it appears to us to be more appropriate to
speak of a ‘‘glocalized perception’’, in which both
the a priori of situation and situatedness are
acknowledged). Similarly, his intriguing account
of a progressive creolism is opposed to the retro-
spective multiculturalism of the artworks he illus-
trates it with. And his description of the restless
traveler and the Internet junky as embodiments of
altermodern art also seem rather anachronistic.
For that matter, Saatchi’s (long the personification
of the postmodern, late capitalist art made flesh)
recent shift away from the Young British Artists
toward contemporary artists from the Middle- and
Far East is far more telling*precisely because it
implies an interest in a variety of ‘‘glocalized
perceptions.’’
The main problem with Bourriaud’s thesis how-
ever, is that it confuses epistemology and ontology.
Bourriaud perceives that the form and function of
the arts have changed, but he cannot understand
how and why they have changed. In order to close
this critical gap, he simply assumes (one could call
this the ‘‘tautological solution’’) that experience
and explanation are one and the same. For
Bourriaud, heterochronicity, archipelagraphy, and
nomadism are not merely expressions of a structure
of feeling; they become the structures of feeling
themselves. And, indeed, it is because he mistakes a
multiplicity of forms for a plurality of structures,
that his conception of altermodernism*as
expressed in the irregularity of the exhibition and
the inconsistency of his writing*‘‘is all over the
shop’’, never becomes wholly comprehensible let
alone convincing.
Bourriaud perceives, say, seven types of fire-
works, in seven kinds of disguises: one is red, one
yellow, one blue, one is circular, one angular, and
so on. But he cannot see that they are all produced
by the same tension: an oscillation between
metals, sulfurs, and potassium nitrates. We will
call this tension, oscillating between*and be-
yond*the electropositive nitrates of the modern
and the electronegative metals of the postmodern,
metamodern.
FROM THE POSTMODERN TO THE
METAMODERN
What do we mean when we say that ‘‘the’’
postmodern has been abandoned for the meta-
modern? It has become somewhat of a common-
place to begin a discussion of the postmodern by
stressing that there is no one such thing as ‘‘the’’
postmodern. After all, ‘‘the’’ postmodern is merely
the ‘‘catchphrase’’ for a multiplicity of contra-
dictory tendencies, the ‘‘buzzword’’ for a plurality
of incoherent sensibilities. Indeed, the initial
heralds of postmodernity, broadly considered to
be Charles Jencks, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Fredric
Jameson, and Ihab Hassan, each analyzed a
different cultural phenomenon*respectively,
a transformation in our material landscape; a
distrust and the consequent desertion of meta-
narratives; the emergence of late capitalism, the
fading of historicism, and the waning of affect;
and a new regime in the arts.13 However, what
these distinct phenomena share is an opposition to
‘‘the’’ modern*to utopism, to (linear) progress,
to grand narratives, to Reason, to functionalism
and formal purism, and so on. These positions can
most appropriately be summarized, perhaps, by
Jos de Mul’s distinction between postmodern
irony (encompassing nihilism, sarcasm, and the
distrust and deconstruction of grand narratives,
the singular and the truth) and modern enthu-
siasm (encompassing everything from utopism to
the unconditional belief in Reason).14
We do not wish to suggest that all postmodern
tendencies are over and done with.15 But we do
believe many of them are taking another shape,
and, more importantly, a new sens, a new meaning
and direction. For one, financial crises, geopoli-
tical instabilities, and climatological uncertainties
have necessitated a reform of the economic system
(‘‘un nouveau monde, un nouveau capitalisme’’, but
also the transition from a white collar to a green
collar economy). For another, the disintegration
Timotheus Velmeulen and Robin van den Akker
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of the political center on both a geopolitical level
(as a result of the rise to prominence of the
Eastern economies) and a national level (due to
the failure of the ‘‘third way’’, the polarization of
localities, ethnicities, classes, and the influence of
the Internet blogosphere) has required a restruc-
turation of the political discourse. Similarly, the
need for a decentralized production of alternative
energy; a solution to the waste of time, space, and
energy caused by (sub)urban sprawls; and a
sustainable urban future have demanded a trans-
formation of our material landscape. Most sig-
nificantly perhaps, the cultural industry has
responded in kind, increasingly abandoning tac-
tics such as pastiche and parataxis for strategies
like myth and metaxis, melancholy for hope, and
exhibitionism for engagement. We will return to
these strategies in more detail shortly.
CEOs and politicians, architects, and artists
alike are formulating anew a narrative of longing
structured by and conditioned on a belief (‘‘yes we
can’’, ‘‘change we can believe in’’) that was long
repressed, for a possibility (a ‘‘better’’ future) that
was long forgotten. Indeed, if, simplistically put,
the modern outlook vis-a`-vis idealism and ideals
could be characterized as fanatic and/or naive, and
the postmodern mindset as apathetic and/or
skeptic, the current generation’s attitude*for it
is, and very much so, an attitude tied to a
generation*can be conceived of as a kind of
informed naivety, a pragmatic idealism.
We would like to make it absolutely clear that
this new shape, meaning, and direction do
not directly stem from some kind of post-9/11
sentiment. Terrorism neither infused doubt about
the supposed superiority of neoliberalism, nor did
it inspire reflection about the basic assumptions of
Western economics, politics, and culture*quite
the contrary. The conservative reflex of the ‘‘war
on terror’’ might even be taken to symbolize
a reaffirmation of postmodern values.16 The
threefold ‘‘threat’’ of the credit crunch, a collapsed
center, and climate change has the opposite effect,
as it infuses doubt, inspires reflection, and incites
a move forward out of the postmodern and into
the metamodern.
So, history is moving beyond its much-
proclaimed end. To be sure, history never ended.
When postmodernist thinkers declared it to have
come to a conclusion, they were referring to a
very particular conception of history*Hegel’s
‘‘positive’’ idealism. Some argued that this notion
of history dialectically progressing toward some
predetermined Telos had ended because human-
kind had realized that this Telos had been
achieved (with the ‘‘universalization of Western
liberal democracy’’).17 Others suggested that it
had come to a conclusion because people realized
its purpose could never be fulfilled*indeed,
because it does not exist. The current, metamo-
dern discourse also acknowledges that history’s
purpose will never be fulfilled because it does not
exist. Critically, however, it nevertheless takes
toward it as if it does exist. Inspired by a modern
naı¨vete´ yet informed by postmodern skepticism,
the metamodern discourse consciously commits
itself to an impossible possibility.
If, epistemologically, the modern and the post-
modern are linked to Hegel’s ‘‘positive’’ idealism,
the metamodern aligns itself with Kant’s ‘‘negative’’
idealism. Kant’s philosophy of history after all, can
also be most appropriately summarized as ‘‘as-if’’
thinking. As Curtis Peters explains, according to
Kant, ‘‘we may view human history as if mankind
had a life narrative which describes its self-move-
ment toward its full rational/social potential . . . to
view history as if it were the story of mankind’s
development’’.18 Indeed, Kant himself adopts the
as-if terminology when he writes ‘‘[e]ach . . .
people, as if following some guiding thread, go
toward a natural but to each of them unknown
goal’’.19 That is to say, humankind, a people, are
not really going toward a natural but unknown
goal, but they pretend they do so that they progress
morally as well as politically. Metamodernism
moves for the sake of moving, attempts in spite
of its inevitable failure; it seeks forever for a truth
that it never expects to find. If you will forgive us
for the banality of the metaphor for a moment, the
metamodern thus willfully adopts a kind of don-
key-and-carrot double-bind. Like a donkey it
chases a carrot that it never manages to eat because
the carrot is always just beyond its reach. But
precisely because it never manages to eat the
carrot, it never ends its chase, setting foot in moral
realms the modern donkey (having eaten its carrot
elsewhere) will never encounter, entering political
domains the postmodern donkey (having aban-
doned the chase) will never come across.
Ontologically, metamodernism oscillates betwe-
en the modern and the postmodern. It oscillates
between a modern enthusiasm and a postmodern
Notes on metamodernism
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irony, between hope and melancholy, between
naı¨vete´ and knowingness, empathy and apathy,
unity and plurality, totality and fragmentation,
purity and ambiguity. Indeed, by oscillating to and
fro or back and forth, the metamodern negotiates
between the modern and the postmodern. One
should be careful not to think of this oscillation as
a balance however; rather, it is a pendulum
swinging between 2, 3, 5, 10, innumerable poles.
Each time the metamodern enthusiasm swings
toward fanaticism, gravity pulls it back toward
irony; the moment its irony sways toward apathy,
gravity pulls it back toward enthusiasm.
Both the metamodern epistemology (as if) and
its ontology (between) should thus be conceived of
as a ‘‘both-neither’’ dynamic. They are each at
once modern and postmodern and neither of
them. This dynamic can perhaps most appropri-
ately be described by the metaphor of metaxis.
Literally, the term metataxis (motajy´) translates as
‘‘between’’. It has however, via Plato and later the
German philosopher Eric Voegelin, come to be
associated with the experience of existence
and consciousness. Voegelin describes metaxis as
follows:
Existence has the structure of the In-
Between, of the Platonic metaxy, and if any-
thing is constant in the history of mankind it
is the language of tension between life and
death, immortality and mortality, perfection
and imperfection, time and timelessness,
between order and disorder, truth and
untruth, sense and senselessness of existence;
between amor Dei and amor sui, l’aˆme ouverte
and l’ame close; . . .20
For Voegelin thus, metaxis intends the extent to
which we are at once both here and there
and nowhere. As one critic puts it: metaxis is
‘‘constituted by the tension, nay, by the irreconcil-
ability of man’s participatory existence between
finite processes on the one hand, and an unlim-
ited, intracosmic or transmundane reality on the
other’’.21 Now, the debate about the meaning of
metaxis is one of the longest running and most
intriguing in the history of philosophy and
deserves (and requires) much more attention than
we can possibly offer here. The account
we provide is therefore inevitably reductive, the
arguments we lend from it inexorably precipitate.
For our purposes, we intend the concept not as a
metaphor for an existential experience that is
general to the condition humaine, but as a meta-
phor for a cultural sensibility that is particular to
the metamodern discourse. The metamodern is
constituted by the tension, no, the double-bind, of
a modern desire for sens and a postmodern doubt
about the sense of it all.
METAMODERN STRATEGIES
Let us take a closer look at some recent trends and
tendencies in contemporary aesthetics to illustrate
what we mean by metamodernism, and to demon-
strate the extent to which it has come to dominate
the cultural imagination over the last few years.
Just as modernism and postmodernism expressed
themselves through a variety of often competing
strategies and styles, the metamodern also articu-
lates itself by means of diverse practices. One of the
most poignant metamodern practices is what the
German theorist Raoul Eshelman has termed
‘‘performatism’’. Eshelman describes performa-
tism as the willful self-deceit to believe in*or
identify with, or solve*something in spite of itself.
He points, for example, to a revival of theism in the
arts, and the reinvention of transparency, kinesis
and impendency in architecture.22
Performatist works are set up in such a way
that the reader or viewer at first has no choice
but to opt for a single, compulsory solution
to the problems raised within the work at
hand. The author, in other words, imposes a
certain solution on us using dogmatic, ritual,
or some other coercive means. This has two
immediate effects. The coercive frame cuts
us off, at least temporarily, from the context
around it and forces us back into the work.
Once we are inside, we are made to identify
with some person, act or situation in a way
that is plausible only within the confines
of the work as a whole. In this way perfor-
matism gets to have its postmetaphysical cake
and eat it too. On the one hand, you’re
practically forced to identify with something
implausible or unbelievable within the
frame*to believe in spite of yourself*but
on the other, you still feel the coercive force
causing this identification to take place, and
intellectually you remain aware of the parti-
cularity of the argument at hand. Metaphy-
sical skepticism and irony aren’t eliminated,
but are held in check by the frame.23
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The leading American art critic Jerry Saltz
also has observed the surfacing of another kind
of sensibility oscillating between beliefs, assump-
tions, and attitudes:
I’m noticing a new approach to artmaking in
recent museum and gallery shows. It flickered
into focus at the New Museum’s ‘‘Younger
Than Jesus’’ last year and ran through the
Whitney Biennial, and I’m seeing it blossom
and bear fruit at ‘‘Greater New York,’’ MoMA
P.S. 1’s twice-a-decade extravaganza of emer-
ging local talent. It’s an attitude that says, I
know that the art I’m creating may seem silly,
even stupid, or that it might have been done
before, but that doesn’t mean this isn’t serious. At
once knowingly self-conscious about art,
unafraid, and unashamed, these young artists
not only see the distinction between earn-
estness and detachment as artificial; they
grasp that they can be ironic and sincere at
the same time, and they are making art from
this compound-complex state of mind*what
Emerson called ‘‘alienated majesty’’.24
Saltz writes exclusively about tendencies in Amer-
ican art, but one can observe similar sentiments
across the European continent. Only recently, the
established BAK Institute in the Netherlands
initiated a group exhibition that was called
‘‘Vectors of the Possible’’. The exhibition, curator
Simon Sheikh explained,
examines the notion of the horizon in art and
politics and explores the ways in which art
works can be said to set up certain horizons
of possibility and impossibility, how art
partakes in specific imaginaries, and how it
can produce new ones, thus suggesting other
ways of imagining the world. Counter to the
post-1989 sense of resignation, [it] suggests
that in the field of art, it is the horizon*as an
‘‘empty signifier’’, an ideal to strive towards,
and a vector of possibility*that unites . . .
and gives . . . direction. The art works in
this exhibition can be seen as vectors, reck-
oning possibility and impossibility in
(un)equal measures, but always detecting
and indicating ways of seeing, and of being,
in the world.25
And the much lauded up-and-coming Gallery
Tanja Wagner introduced its opening exhibition
with the remarkably analogous words:
The works [at display] convey enthusiasm as
well as irony. They play with hope and
melancholy, oscilliate between knowledge
and naivety, empathy and apathy, wholeness
and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity, . . .
looking for a truth without expecting to find
it.26
Elsewhere, the cultural critic Jo¨rg Heiser has
perceived the emergence of what he calls ‘‘Ro-
mantic Conceptualism’’.27 Heiser argues that
the rational, calculated conceptual art of Jeff
Koons, Thomas Demand, and Cindy Sherman
is increasingly replaced with the affective and
often sentimental abstractions of Tacita Dean,
Didier Courbot, and Mona Hatoum. Where
Demand reproduces the most concrete simulacra,
Dean creates affective illusions that can never
materialize. Where Koons obsesses over the ob-
scene, Courbot is concerned with the increasingly
obsolete. And whereas Sherman criticizes subjec-
tivity, Hatoum celebrates the felt heterogeneity of
identity. If the postmodern deconstructs, Heiser’s
Romantic Conceptualism is concerned with
reconstruction.
The film critic James MacDowell, finally, has
noted the emergence of the so-called quirky
cinema associated with the films of Michel Gondry
and Wes Anderson.28 MacDowell describes quirky
as a recent trend in Indie cinema characterized by
the attempt to restore, to the cynical reality of
adults, a childlike naivety*as opposed to the
postmodern ‘‘smart’’ cinema of the 1990s, which
was typified by sarcasm and indifference. And yet
others have recognized movements as diverse as
Remodernism, Reconstructivism, Renewalism,
the New Sincerity, The New Weird Generation,
Stuckism, Freak Folk, and so on. The list, indeed,
of trends and movements surpassing, or attempt-
ing to surpass, the postmodern is inexhaustive.
Nicholas Bourriaud would undoubtedly argue
that this multiplicity of strategies expresses a
plurality of structures of feeling. However, what
they have in common is a typically metamodern
oscillation, an unsuccessful negotiation, between
two opposite poles. In performatist attempts to
defy the cosmic laws and the forces of nature, to
make the permanent transitory and the transient
permanent, it expresses itself dramatically. In
Romantic Conceptualist efforts to present the
ordinary with mystery and the familiar with the
seemliness of the unfamiliar it exposes itself less
spectacularly, as the unsuccessful negotiation
between culture and nature. But both these
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practices set out to fulfill a mission or task they
know they will not, can never, and should never
accomplish: the unification of two opposed poles.
NEOROMANTICISM
The world must be romanticized. In this way its
original meaning will be rediscovered. To
romanticize is nothing but a qualitative
heightening [Potenzierung]. In this process
the lower self is identified with a better self.
[...] Insofar as I present the commonplace
with significance, the ordinary with mystery,
the familiar with the seemliness of the
unfamiliar and the finite with the semblance
of the infinite, I romanticize it. (Novalis29)
At the time of writing, metamodernism appears to
find its clearest expression in an emergent neor-
omantic sensibility. This can hardly be called
surprising. For Kant’s negative idealism too was
most successfully expressed by the early German
Romantic spirit.30 Now, of course, Romanticism
is a notoriously pluralistic and ambiguous (and
consequently uniquely frequently misinterpreted)
concept. Arthur Lovejoy once noted that there are
so many different, often differing definitions of the
concept that we might rather speak of Romanti-
cisms.31 And Isaiah Berlin, one of our time’s most
adept critics of the Romantic worldview, observed
that Romanticism, in short, is
unity and multiplicity. It is fidelity to the
particular . . . and also mysterious tantalising
vagueness of outline. It is beauty and
ugliness. It is art for art’s sake, and art as
instrument of social salvation. It is strength
and weakness, individualism and collecti-
vism, purity and corruption, revolution and
reaction, peace and war, love of life and love
of death.32
However, essentially, the Romantic attitude can
be defined precisely by its oscillation between
these opposite poles.33 Romanticism is about the
attempt to turn the finite into the infinite, while
recognizing that it can never be realized. As
Schlegel put it, ‘‘that it should forever be becom-
ing and never be perfected’’.34 Of course, it is also
specifically about Bildung, about self-realization,
about Zaı¨s and Isis, but for our purposes,
this general idea of the Romantic as oscillating
between attempt and failure, or as Schlegel wrote,
between ‘‘enthusiasm and irony’’, or in de Mul’s
words, between a ‘‘modern enthusiasm and a
postmodern irony’’, is sufficient.35 It is from this
hesitation also that the Romantic inclination
toward the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny
stem, aesthetic categories lingering between pro-
jection and perception, form and the unformable,
coherence and chaos, corruption and innocence.
It is somewhat surprising that we appear to be
among the first academics to discern in contem-
porary arts a sensibility akin to Romanticism. For
in the arts, the return of the Romantic, whether as
style, philosophy, or attitude, has been widely
professed. In 2007 Jo¨rg Heiser, co-editor of Frieze,
curated an exhibition in Vienna and Nurnberg
called ‘‘Romantic Conceptualism’’. A mere
2 years earlier, The Schirnhalle in Frankfurt
hosted ‘‘Ideal Worlds: New Romanticism in Con-
temporary Art’’. In addition, the TATE Britain
has recently held a Peter Doig retrospective, while
the MOMA looked back at the life and work of
Bas Jan Ader. And then we have not even
mentioned the multitude of galleries exposing
the often-figurative paintings and photographs of
twilights and full moons, ethereal cityscapes and
sublime landscapes, secret societies and sects,
estranged men and women, and strange boys
and girls. It appears that, after all those years,
the parody and pastiche of Jeff Koons, Jake and
Dinos Chapman, and Damien Hirst, the ironic
deconstruction of Cindy Sherman and Sarah
Lucas, and the nihilist destruction of Paul
McCarthy, are finally as out of place as they
always pretended to be*but, in times where
‘‘anything goes’’, hardly ever were.
This Romantic sensibility has been expressed in
a wide variety of art forms and a broad diversity of
styles, across media and surfaces. It has been
visible in Herzog and de Meuron’s negotiations
between the permanent and the temporary; in Bas
Jan Ader’s questioning of Reason by the irrational;
in Peter Doig’s re-appropriation of culture
through nature; and in Gregory Crewdson and
David Lynch’s adaptation of civilization by the
primitive. It can be perceived in Olafur Eliasson,
Glen Rubsamen, Dan Attoe, and Armin Boehm’s
obsessions with the commonplace ethereal, in
Catherine Opie’s fixation with the quotidian
sublime. It can be observed in Justine Kurland,
Kaye Donachie, and David Thorpe’s fascination
with fictitious sects (Figures 1 and 2), or in
Darren Almond and Charles Avery’s interest for
Timotheus Velmeulen and Robin van den Akker
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fictional elsewheres. And one can see it in the
plethora of works of artists anew attempting to
come to terms with their unconsciousness (think,
for example, of Ragnar Kjartansson’s at once
grotesque and heartfelt attempts to (re)create
both his ‘‘erotic fantasies of death, longing and
eternity’’36 and the Weltschmerz stemming from
his failure to do so entirely, or of Selja Kameric’s
attempts to retrieve an irrevocably irretrievable
past, or of Michel Gondry, Spike Jonze, and Wes
Anderson’s attempts to rekindle the naivety and
innocence of their childhood). What these strate-
gies and styles have in common with one another
is their use of tropes of mysticism, estrangement,
and alienation to signify potential alternatives; and
their conscious decision to attempt, in spite of
those alternatives’, untenableness.
Indeed, both Ader’s attempts to unite life and
death*and Reason and the miraculous, and self-
determination and faith*and Rubsamen’s efforts
to unify culture and nature might have been more
‘‘successful’’ had they employed other methods
and materials. Ader could have equipped himself
with a better boat in order to sail the seas (In
search of the miraculous, 1975); and he could have
trained himself better in the art of tree climbing in
order to longer hang on to branches (Broken fall,
1971). Similarly, Rubsamen could have applied
strategies of simulation and/or techniques of
postproduction in order to make the electricity
poles and lampposts (I’ve brought you a friend,
2007; Figure 3) look more like the magical trees
and ethereal bushes they are supposed to resem-
ble. The reason these artists haven’t opted to
employ methods and materials better suited
to their mission or task is that their intention is
not to fulfill it, but to attempt to fulfill it in spite of
its ‘‘unfulfillableness’’. The point of Ader’s jour-
ney is precisely that he might not return from it; of
his tree climbing precisely that he cannot but fall
eventually. Similarly, the point of Rubsamen’s
pursuit also is exactly that it cannot be fulfilled:
culture and nature cannot be one and the
same, nor can any one of them ever entirely
overtake the other.
One should be careful, however, not to confuse
this oscillating tension (a bothneither) with some
Figure 2. Kaye Donachie, Early Morning Hours of the
Night (2003). Oil on Canvas. Courtesy Maureen Paley.
Figure 1. David Thorpe, Covenant of the East (2003). Mixed media collage. Courtesy Saatchi Gallery, Maureen Paley, and
303 gallery.
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kind of postmodern in-between (a neithernor).
Indeed, both metamodernism and the postmodern
turn to pluralism, irony, and deconstruction in
order to counter a modernist fanaticism. However,
in metamodernism this pluralism and irony are
utilized to counter the modern aspiration, while in
postmodernism they are employed to cancel it out.
That is to say, metamodern irony is intrinsically
bound to desire, whereas postmodern irony is
inherently tied to apathy. Consequently, the
metamodern art work (or rather, at least as the
metamodern art work has so far expressed itself
by means of neoromanticism) redirects the mod-
ern piece by drawing attention to what it cannot
present in its language, what it cannot signify in its
own terms (that what is often called the sublime,
the uncanny, the ethereal, the mysterious, and so
forth). The postmodern work deconstructs it by
pointing exactly to what it presents, by exposing
precisely what it signifies.
The difference between the metamodern oscil-
lation that marks contemporary art and the
postmodern in-betweenness that signified much
of the art of the 1990s, 1980s, 1970s, and 1960s is
perhaps most visible in the work of those artists
and architects who engage with everyday life, the
commonplace, and the mundane. Postmodern
works, like Rachel Whiteread’s reconstructions,
Daniel Buren’s installations, or Martha Rosler’s
videos, deconstruct our assumptions about our
lived spaces. Metamodern ‘‘Romantic’’ works,
such as Armin Boehm’s city vistas, Gregory
Crewdson’s small townscapes, and yes, David
Lynch’s close-ups of suburban rituals, redir-
ect*and indeed, heighten*our presuppositions
about our built environment.
Boehm paints aerial views of commuter towns as
at once enchanted and haunted. His oil painting,
both tentative and figurative, both atonal and
intensely colorful, with a darkness full of light,
depicts places that are simultaneously the places
we live in and places we have never experienced
before. Crewdson (Figure 4) photographs towns
haunted by the nature they repress, disavow, or
sublimate. In his work of tree-lined streets, white
picket-fenced gardens, and picture-windowed
houses are sites for inexplicable natural events,
from local twilights to people shoveling earth into
their hallways, and planting flowers in their
lounges, to robins picking at limbs buried below
ground. And Lynch’s films too frequently thrive on
moments that are, at once repulsive and attractive,
beyond our grasp. They often tend toward the
uncanny, abound with local animism, haunted
houses, and surreal characters. A film like Blue
Velvet (1995) not merely convinces us to distrust
Reason. It persuades us to believe there are matters
Reason cannot account for: a flickering light, a
sadomasochistic relationship, a man wearing
sunglasses at night, a blind man who can somehow
see, the behavior of robins, an ear in the grass, and
so on. The film presents these instances as haunt-
ing apparitions, within its texture as much as in its
diegesis. They are woven into it, at times divulging
the film’s plot slowly, then again disrupting it
abruptly. Each apparition signifies a narratively
inexplicable (but, and that is the point, incredibly
fertile) change in tempo, tune, and tone; alternat-
ing from comic to tragic, from romantic to horrific
and back; turning the commonplace into a site of
ambiguity, of mystery, and unfamiliarity, to us as
much as to its characters.
In architectural practices this distinction be-
tween a metamodern oscillation and a postmodern
in-between is even more pronounced*perhaps
especially because an emergent metamodern style
still needs to distinguish itself from the dominant
postmodern discourse,37 or perhaps especially
Figure 3. Glenn Rubsamen, I’ve decided to say nothing (2006). Acryllic on linen, dyptich. Courtesy Robert Miller Gallery.
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because architecture cannot but be concrete. The
works of ‘‘starchitects’’ Herzog and De Meuron are
exemplary here. Their more recent designs express
a metamodern attitude in and through a style that
can only be called neoromantic. A few brief
descriptions suffice, here, to get a hint of their
look and feel. The exterior of the De Young
Museum (San Francisco, 2005) is clad in copper
plates that will slowly turn green as a result of
oxidization; the interior of the Walker Art Center
(Minneapolis, 2005) holds such natural elements
as chandeliers of rock and crystal; and the fac¸ade of
the Caixa Forum (Madrid, 2008) appears to be
partly rusting and partly overtaken by vegetation.
While the above examples are appropriations or
expansions of existing sites, their recent designs for
whole new structures are even more telling. The
library of the Brandenburg Technical University
(Cottbus, 2004) is a gothic castle with a translu-
cent fac¸ade overlain with white lettering; the
Chinese national stadium (Beijing, 2008) looks
like a ‘‘dark and enchanted forest’’ from up close
and like a giant bird’s nest from a far38; the
residential skyscraper at 560 Leonard street
(NYC, under construction) is reminiscent of an
eroded rock; the Miami Art Museum (Florida,
under construction) contains Babylonic hanging
gardens; the Elbe Philharmonic Hall (Hamburg,
under construction, see Figure 5) seems to be a
giant iceberg washed ashore; and Project Triangle
(Paris, under construction) is an immense glass
pyramid that casts no shadows while it hovers over
the city.
These buildings attempt to negotiate between
such opposite poles as culture and nature, the
finite and the infinite, the commonplace and the
ethereal, a formal structure, and a formalist
unstructuring (as opposed to deconstruction).
Crucially, these attempts are unsuccessful as the
buildings never so much seem to balance these
distinct poles as oscillate between them. Fragile
(bird’s nest), disappearing (iceberg), or perishing
(eroded rock) natural phenomena question the
solidity of structures more or less built for
permanence; while a mythical building (castle)
from the days of old seems to be either resurrected
from the past or mysteriously unaffected by time.
Some edifices seem to be either left to the
elements (oxidizing copper, rust) or seamlessly
integrated with nature (overgrown walls, hanging
gardens); yet others seem to defy the basic laws of
geometry and gravity by means of their torsions.
Lucid surfaces, radiating with light, give the most
of ordinary sites a mysterious appearance; while
ancient symbols (Pyramid) points toward transi-
ent cultures and the infinity of the cosmos.
Ader’s, Thorpe’s, Lynch’s and Herzog & De
Meuron’s unsuccessful negotiations*the double-
Figure 4. Gregory Crewdson, Untitled (2004). Photograph. Courtesy Luhring Augustine and White Cube.
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bind of both/neither*expose a tension that cannot
be described in terms of the modern or the
postmodern, but must be conceived of as meta-
modernism expressed by means of a neoromanti-
cism.39 If these artists look back at the Romantic it
is neither because they simply want to laugh
at it (parody) nor because they wish to cry for it
(nostalgia). They look back instead in order to
perceive anew a future that was lost from sight.
Metamodern neoromanticism should not merely be
understood as re-appropriation; it should be inter-
preted as re-signification: it is the re-signification of
‘‘the commonplace with significance, the ordinary
with mystery, the familiar with the seemliness of
the unfamiliar, and the finite with the semblance of
the infinite’’. Indeed, it should be interpreted as
Novalis, as the opening up of new lands in situ of
the old one.
CONCLUSION: ATOPIC METAXIS
Conceiving of the metamodern at the closing of a
decade in which about every other philosopher,
cultural theorist, and art critic has attempted to
conceptualize the aftermath of the postmodern
might be considered to be anachronistic, out of
place, and*if one still feels the need to conceive it
anew despite the multiplicity of attempts that
conceptualized it priori*pretentious. It is there-
fore ironic that our inquiries into the discursivity
by which current geopolitical tendencies can be
explained and the sensibility by which the arts
express themselves have led us precisely to those
three concerns: a deliberate being out of time, an
intentional being out of place, and the pretense
that that desired atemporality and displacement
are actually possible even though they are not.
If the modern thus expresses itself by way of a
utopic syntaxis, and the postmodern expresses
itself by means of a dystopic parataxis, the
metamodern, it appears, exposes itself through
a-topic metaxis. The GreekEnglish lexicon trans-
lates atopos (atopow), respectively, as strange,
extraordinary, and paradoxical. However, most
theorists and critics have insisted on its literal
meaning: a place (topos) that is no (a) place. We
could say thus that atopos is, impossibly, at once a
place and not a place, a territory without bound-
aries, a position without parameters. We have
already described metaxis as being simultaneously
here, there, and nowhere. In addition, taxis
(ta?jiw) means ordering. Thus, if the modern
suggests a temporal ordering, and the postmodern
implies a spatial disordering, then the metamo-
dern should be understood as a spacetime that is
both*neither ordered and disordered. Metamo-
dernism displaces the parameters of the present
with those of a future presence that is futureless;
and it displaces the boundaries of our place with
those of a surreal place that is placeless. For
indeed, that is the ‘‘destiny’’ of the metamodern
wo/man: to pursue a horizon that is forever
receding.
Figure 5. Herzog & de Meuron, Elbe Philharmonie. Copyright Herzog & de Meuron.
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